NOTES MADE DURING A TOUR OF SPECIAL SERVICE
IN NORTH CHINA IN 1894-1895 (CHINA-JAPANESE
WAR.)

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The writer was accredited to the Chinese Government and
attached to the Chinese Army in the field, to report upon the
medical organisation of their army, and upon the nature of the
wounds caused by the small-bore rifle bullet which was expected
to be used by the Japanese. But in respect of both objects the
mission was fruitless, inasmuch as the Chinese Army had no sort
of medical provision, and the Japanese, owing to some defect in
their new small-bore magazine rifle, had recalled all those issued,
and re-issued the former old Mourata rifle to their troops, whose
calibre was .432 of an inch, and which fired a toughened bullet
much like that of the Martini-Henry rifle.

In view, however, of the locality of the fighting now proceeding
in Manchuria and the climatic conditions of North China and
Manchuria, and of the fact that the conditions of unpreparedness,
military and medical, of the Chinese army are now much as
described here, these notes may be found of some interest.

The war, at the time of our reaching Tientsin (November, 1894),
had reached the following stage.

The Japanese had ejected the Chinese troops from Corea, where
the battles of A-san, and Ping-yang had been fought, and the Army
of Manchuria had taken Feng-hwang-cheng, and was marching on
the Mo-tien-ling pass, which was said to be held by the Chinese.
The Port Arthur army was being got ready, but had not embarked.
The army which operated against Wei-hai-wei was a third and
distinct army which was subsequently formed.

The only railway then existing was between Tong-kou (near the
mouth of the Pei-ho) and Tientsin, and Tientsin and Shan-hai-kwan
at the termination of the great wall of China on the Pechili gulf.
All other journeys had to be made by road or boat.

Communication by water ceases about the middle of November,
when the country is frozen hard, and so remains till March.

THE CHINESE SOLDIER.

Personnel.—The great majority of Chinese troops in the neigh-
bourhood of Shan-hai-kwan, Peking, and Tientsin were Northern
men. Their physique is better, and they are larger men than the Southern and Western Chinese. They are recruited, however, from the lowest class, and their life is an idle one in peace-time. They practice all the vices. They have been drilled generally in the German fashion, but they are indifferently set up and never look smart. (I am not now speaking of the Manchus). Their winter dress consists of a camlet coat, trousers and divided apron, a cummerbund, linen or cotton socks with quilted soles, cloth, velvet, or thin leather boots with thick paper soles covered with string. Underclothing, generally of cotton and according to the wearer's fancy. A sheepskin great-coat, reaching to the ankles. The sheepskin coat is not worn by all, as I believe the Commander of the regiment receives money for dressing his men, and does not always supply this article. The trousers are gathered in about the ankles with the socks inside, and a webbing bandage is wrapped circularly round the junction.

The infantry are variously armed, or unarmed, as the case may be. A regiment on the march is ordered as follows: They march in single file generally, and the number of the main body may be about 200. In front come two trumpeters with straight brass trumpets like coach horns. Following them are from twenty to forty standard bearers. These are succeeded by ten to twenty men with halberts and tridents, and these by one or two jingals, each carried by two men. The remainder carry firearms of various patterns—old tower muskets, Enfield rifles, Remingtons, Martini-Henry, and Mauser-Mannlicher magazine rifles, all very dirty and with the bayonets fixed; sometimes the scabbard is on the bayonet, with the belt and pouch attached. None of the men I saw had valises, but they seem to be at liberty to carry any article they can. All have tobacco or opium pipes, some umbrellas or swords tied upon their backs. After the rank and file follows a clerk on horseback with the commission of the Commander and other officers stuck into a pouch on his back, and visible above his head and shoulders. The Commander follows in a sedan chair or cart, surrounded by a small cavalry escort.

The regimental baggage follows at large intervals in drays; the baggage guard and a number of stragglers riding in the carts. Stragglers may be seen singly or in groups of three or four at any point from the last halting place, and may amount to 100 or 200 men.

The marches are generally arranged to suit the ordinary pedestrian rest-houses, which are about twelve miles apart, and the men go much as they please; and I have seen a man fall out to try and
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shoot a pigeon with his rifle. The Company officers carry swords but are otherwise not distinguishable from the men. This description applies to the majority of the regiments that I saw, but there are better armed men than these among the Viceroy Li's special troops. At Pa-li-chao bridge I saw a whole Khansu regiment without any fire-arms at all.

The arms are sometimes tied together in bundles and carried in the baggage wagons, together with cooking utensils and bows and arrows.

The cavalry do not march in very large bodies; the largest body I saw numbered seventy-eight men. These were in three squadrons. They ride Mongolian ponies, and are armed with a long lance (about twelve feet) with a wooden shaft and iron head, and carry a heavy sword, which is fastened to the saddle under the left thigh, and a carbine (pattern various). They also have a profusion of banners. They ride with a very short stirrup but seem fair horsemen.

The artillery are said to be better drilled than the other arms.

The dress of the Southern troops differs from that of the Northern, in that they wear a black or dark green turban, instead of a felt cap, in winter. They are smaller men, but are not essentially different.

The camps are generally permanent, or if new, are placed in the neighbourhood of permanent camps. The older camps have walls 10 to 30 feet high, made of mud and chopped straw (there is no stone in this country). They are rectangular in plan, and the walls are triangularly prismatic in section and sometimes crenulated at the top. A gun is placed at each angle. Each camp generally contains 400 to 600 men, who are housed, in the permanent camps, in mud huts. The Commanding officer has a yamen often of large dimensions.

The sites of camps are generally chosen with reference to water-supply or other convenience, and their strategic position is of secondary importance. New camps have walls of 5 or 6 feet high, which are added to according to the length of time of their occupation. The first thing a regiment does on choosing a camping ground, is to make a mud wall, inside which everything is placed at once.

In newly constructed camps and temporary posts, tents are used. They are of the pal pattern made of two thicknesses of cotton, blue or white, and have an area of about 100 square feet. As many men as can lie in this space are crowded into them.
Their arms are piled outside. There are no special means of ablu­tion, and there is very little desire for ablution on the part of the men in winter. They go outside the camp to defecate, and the faeces are either collected by the peasants for manure, or eaten by pigs and dogs. There is surprisingly little filth about these camps. The camps are almost always near a river or near an old well. Very little water is drunk as such, as tea is the universal beverage. All the water in the Chili plain is saturated with salts, and all the stream waters have a great quantity of sediment. The water is cleared with alum before it is used by means of a crystal of alum set in a cleft bamboo which is stirred about in the vessel.

The Northern troops use Kao-liang (giant millet) as their staple food; pork and mutton and fish when procurable. Fish abounds everywhere in this country and is generally wholesome. The Southern troops and Manchu “Bannermen” use rice, which is imported from the South.

All Chinamen cook their own food, and in the regiments the men are divided into squads for messing purposes.

Supply of fuel is the great difficulty in this country, as coal is not used by the peasants, and there are no trees available. Charcoal and dead grass and Kao-liang straw are used as fuel, both for cooking and for warmth, and great economy is exercised in their use. Every child has a bamboo rake to collect fragments, and every combustible substance is continually gathered. The charcoal comes in great measure from Manchuria.

The cooking is done over clay braziers, and most of the food is boiled. The rice and Kao-liang are boiled in thin cast-iron vessels of about three gallon capacity. The men during the war were engaged at seven taels (about £1) a month, but they never received more than three, and it happened more than once that they received no pay at all for two months.

Desertion was very frequent, and whole groups of men who had enlisted from the railway and arsenal would return to their work in two or three days after enlisting, the richer by a suit of camlet uniform. The men are paid in brass cash, which is very bulky and difficult of conveyance. Fifteen railway trucks were employed to carry the pay of 7,000 men for two months in this coin.

Transport.—The transport of stores and passenger traffic, excluding the railway traffic from Tientsin via Taku, and the steamboat traffic up the Peiho to Tientsin, is effected by rail or by water. The road conveyances in common use are heavy carts or drays, light passenger carts, wheelbarrows, and rickshas. Not much
carrying is done by hand in this part of the country. Camels ply as far as Ho-shi-wu, carrying coal, wool, &c., and mules, ponies and donkeys are used for riding. Mule litters are occasionally seen, and persons of distinction travel in sedan chairs with four to eight bearers.

The roads are in the best condition during the winter, and for considerable distances from Peking, and also on the road from Tientsin to Peking; they were in former times well constructed and flagged, but have now fallen into disrepair, partly, no doubt, owing to floods, which have destroyed whole sections of the road. The whole of the country about Tientsin and Taku, and nearly up to Peking, is alluvial, and formed of an argillaceous detritus. In winter it is very compact, and where the road has disappeared carts easily travel over the fields. In summer, however, and during the rains, travelling by land is difficult.

The drays, or heavy carts, are generally used for goods traffic. They are two-wheeled conveyances, and can carry about three tons. They are drawn by three or more animals abreast, and travel about two and a half to three miles an hour. They are without springs, and make frequent stoppages. The gauge for all wheeled conveyances has to be the same, as they travel in one another's tracks, and the ruts are often a foot in depth. Forty-four inches is the width of these carts between the inner edges of the tyres. They could carry two wounded men lying down, and four or five sitting, in addition to the driver. Plenty of straw would have to be put into the cart to give spring, as otherwise the jolting would be intolerable. The slow pace is also a drawback.

Light Carts.—These carts are generally used for passengers, and the cart system in use in North China is said by those capable of judging, to be the best possible in this country. They are strong, their construction is simple, they are easily repaired, and they are so much on one pattern that their parts are almost interchangeable. I append a drawing to scale of one of those used within the Great Wall. Beyond the Great Wall the gauge is wider, and to meet this the wheels of those carts which travel both inside and outside, can be shifted to suit either gauge, the axle tree being adapted to this end. These carts carry about half a ton, and can go up to seven miles an hour, their average pace being a little over five miles. They have no springs, indeed, no vehicle with springs would be able to survive the unevennesses of the roads for any length of time. They are drawn by one mule or pony, or by two, tandem. The passenger sits inside, and the driver on the spring of the shaft. The baggage
is put on the cart's tail. They have hoops and a hood which can be extended by means of a spar socketed into the shaft, so as to cover the driver, and the mule as far as its withers. A certain amount of spring in the grandee's carts is given, by putting the axle tree quite at the tail end of the cart. This is not generally done, as it throws too much weight on the wheeler's back.

The axle tree, which is as costly as the whole of the rest of the cart, is made of hard wood from Szechuen, of a particular kind. Into the axle where the inner and outer ends of the nave come, are let four steel pegs of 2 by \( \frac{1}{2} \) by \( \frac{1}{2} \) inch, the ends of which bear against the inner surface of brass castings. These castings are let into the nave of the wheel.

When the pegs are worn down, or the brasses are worn large, the pegs are withdrawn and padded up with paper. They are then replaced, and a firm bearing is obtained (see sketch).
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The shafts are continuous with the cart tail, and are fastened to the frame, which is slotted to receive wooden pegs of about ten inches in length. These latter hold the axle tree in place.

The body of the cart is a light superstructure, with panels behind and at the sides. The hood is upon a bamboo frame and attached to the panels.

When the hinder panels are removed, a longitudinal space of seven feet is obtained.

One wounded man lying down, one man sitting, and the driver, could be accommodated in such a cart.
Plenty of straw, or an old pattern waggon-stretcher would be necessary.

*Wheelbarrows.*—The wheelbarrows used here could not very well carry a lying down wounded man, but could easily carry two men sitting. They can carry about three cwt., and are used a good deal by passengers for short distances. Very often a pony or donkey is used to draw them, as well as the man who pushes and guides.

*Mule Litters.*—These are practically sedan chairs, with a mule in front and one behind. Only sitting up accommodation is afforded for one person. Travel five miles an hour on good ground.

*Sedan Chairs.*—The accommodation is for one person only, sitting, but the carriers might very well be utilised as dhooly or stretcher-bearers. Travel four miles an hour.

*Rickshas.*—These can only be used on fair roads, and then for one person sitting.

*Water Transport*—The usual summer mode of travelling from Tientsin to Peking is by water as far as Tung Chow, and for sick and wounded it would be far preferable to any existing land conveyance. The Peiho is navigable by small steam launches up to Tung Chow, and one steam launch or cutter could tow four to six travelling boats up stream. The river is very tortuous, and requires experience in its navigation, but with this, the journey from Tientsin to Peking could be done in forty-eight hours. The usual means of working up are sailing and tracking, and only in very strong W. or N.W. winds is it necessary to tie up. The journey down with the stream is without difficulty.

The Grand Canal is another waterway, and the whole country is so intersected by canals, that given an action anywhere in the neighbourhood in other than winter months, water transport should be largely used for the conveyance of wounded. In the winter *peizas*, or ice-sledges, would take the place of boats in a very great measure.

*Boats.*—The ordinary passenger boats carry two passengers with separate sitting and sleeping accommodation, and, as a rule, three hands.

If necessary, four lying down and six sitting wounded men could be carried in one of these.

There are larger boats which could take eight men lying down and twelve sitting.

The number of boats is practically unlimited.

The *Medical Organisation* amounts to nothing. If catechised,
the Chinese Generals say that every camp, or regiment, called a "Ying," has its surgeon and its hospital, but the fact is that generally no such person as the surgeon, and no such place as the hospital, exist. The Viceroy, Li-Hung-Chang, of Chili, prompted by Europeans long before the war, built a hospital at Tientsin and a medical school, and his wife endowed them. These were for the purpose of treating the sick, soldiers and others, and of instructing Chinese students in the Western science of medicine, with the view

![Fig. 3.—Peiza (ice-sledge used on frozen canals), propelled by iron-shod pole.](image-url)
ultimately of making them Army Surgeons. At the same time a teacher was procured from England, and Dr. Irwin, of Tientsin, was appointed Surgeon-General to the Chinese Army, and Superintendent-in-Chief of the Tientsin Hospital, with one Kin, a Western-taught Chinese doctor, to assist him. Medical stores were got from Home, and the establishment started. A hospital in connection with the Navy was made at Wei-hai-wei, and another at Port Arthur, where European surgeons were employed. Thus far all went well. But at the time when the war broke out, there were no surgeons ready to be sent to the Army, with the exception of Dr. Kin, who was detached from his post at the Tientsin Medical School, where he was assistant teacher. No medical Field stores were ready, and consequently the Army had no medical attendance to look forward to.

When the authorities were appealed to, three thousand taels (£525) were offered to provide medical equipment for the entire army. It was therefore manifestly not the intention of the Chinese Government to strain themselves in this direction. In the fleet the case was similar. During the operations in Korea, no medical attendance was forthcoming. The hospital at Port Arthur had to be abandoned, owing to the demeanour of the troops there on the threatened attack by the Japanese. At Wei-hai-wei the Chinese Hospital subordinates bolted, and left Dr. Kirke to do all the work. This hospital had also eventually to be left.

When General Sung occupied Mo-tien-ling, and the Japanese were advancing in Manchuria, Dr. Kin was ordered to proceed to the scene of action, and was provided with some trivial medical stores. He was to go to Niu-chwang, and from thence to proceed towards the front. He found great difficulty in obtaining transport, and his mission was not appreciated, nor were his movements assisted by the Chinese Generals. Eventually he got to Kinchow, in Manchuria, when the Japanese were at Hai-cheng, and there he treated, as best he could, a great number of wounded who had got so far, and temporarily dressed the wounds of many others who were on their way to Tientsin. He had one apothecary with him who assisted him, and these two had to treat the wounded of the entire Army of the North.

From Kinchow the wounded found their way to Niu-chwang, where they were treated by volunteer Missionary and Naval Surgeons. From Niu-chwang they passed to Shan-hai-kwan, where again for a short time there were two doctors of the Red Cross Society, who attended to them. At Shan-hai-kwan they were entrained in trucks, &c., to Tientsin.
During the earlier part of the war, before the rivers had closed, a few wounded from Asan and Ping-yang had come in small numbers by various routes to Tientsin, and at that time there was sufficient, and more than sufficient accommodation for them in the Viceroy’s Hospital, and in the London Missionary Hospital.

The interior economy of the Viceroy’s Hospital was exceedingly bad, and great difficulty was always experienced in obtaining necessary articles. The nursing was done by ignorant coolies, and practically everything was left in the hands of the surgeons. The hospital was, however, occasionally visited by Chinese officials.

A reward or bonus of ten taels was given to a severely wounded man on his discharge, three taels to a slightly wounded man, and a daily allowance of fifteen mace was given for each patient, for his subsistence in hospital. This money had to pass through the hands of a native clerk, and I think not more than half of it ever found its way into the patient’s food. In Chinese matters this “squeezing” is always inevitable.

Upwards of 1,200 patients were treated in the hospitals from first to last, and many who were healed passed through them to receive their bonus.

Towards the end of the war the Viceroy’s Hospital was always full; but from the bad sanitation of the place, and the patients having to remain in the clothes in which they came in, it was necessary to avoid any but the most imperative operations. Hence the policy of interfering surgically as little as possible was followed.

On our arrival at Peking the British Minister held out but slender hopes of our being able to accompany the Chinese Army, as they were retreating at every point of contact with the enemy, and the whereabouts of their headquarters was a matter of conjecture.

We visited the Tsung-li-yamen (Chinese Foreign Office), under the auspices of the British Minister, to obtain credentials to Chinese generals, and an escort, but permission to join the fighting force was absolutely refused us.

Having failed in our object we returned to Tientsin, as being the most central place for access to any point.

Here we visited the Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang, to see whether he could give us any aid; but even he seemed suspicious of our intentions, and said that all he could do would be to give us a permit to visit the forts and camps at Shan-hai-kwan, at the rail head, where a force was being collected to oppose the Japanese advance from Manchuria to Peking. With these we proceeded by rail to
Shan-hai-kwan. Here also it was evident that we were regarded with suspicion.

The Chief Commander was General Woo-ta-Cheung, and there were two other Generals. We had been told to show our permits to them, and they would give us facilities for inspecting the works. We sent round our cards and the permits in the morning, but one General pleaded sickness, another business, and so forth, and it appeared probable that they had been told not to let us see too much. In the afternoon, however, Woo-ta-Cheung sent word that he would receive us in his camp. We got a mounted escort of two body-guard men and rode thither. His camp was a permanent one, and he had a large retinue and a military band. He professed willingness to further our views, and in conversation displayed a most amazing ignorance. His subsequent proceedings, which are notorious, show clearly how ignorant he and men of his class are.

We met and dined with two other military officials, and from them we obtained a number of statements as to the numbers and condition of the men, and as to commissariat and medical arrangements, upon the truth of which, however, no reliance could be placed. Having exhausted our resources of information, we returned to Tientsin.

In the meantime wounded had been coming in in driblets from Port Arthur and Corea, crossing the Gulf of Pe-Chili in junks and landing on the Southern Coast, and going overland to Tientsin. I therefore remained there to see as much as possible of them, as the authorities held out no hopes of our going to Manchuria, the Niu-chwang river would be closed very shortly, and the overland road was beset by fugitive soldiers, who were robbing and murdering freely. Great distress had fallen upon the inhabitants of the country on account of the excesses of the soldiers who were fleeing, and of those on their march towards the scene of operations. Mo-tien-ling Pass was supposed to be held by General Tsung, but the Japanese were moving slowly, and the information of the Chinese was so bad, that nothing could be received with confidence as to the state of things.

The water-communication was soon entirely suspended, owing to the freezing of the Pei-ho, and all the wounded arriving were frost-bitten to a greater or less extent, having had to journey long distances overland by any conveyance they could obtain. Many died on the way, and the state of the wounds of those who arrived was very filthy.

After the fall of Wei-hai-wei, a few wounded came from that place,
but it was not until February that they arrived in large numbers from the Manchurian battle-fields. During this month and March about 700 came by rail from Shan-hai-kwan, and were treated in the Viceroy’s and the three missionary hospitals. I took charge of half of the Viceroy’s Hospital at the expressed desire of Dr. Irwin, who was appointed to the charge of all medical affairs in the Chinese Army, and who was superintendent of that hospital. By this means I was enabled to see and treat with a free hand about 100 wounded for a period of six weeks, and to visit at the same time those in the other hospitals.

Japanese Arms.—As has been above stated the rifle used by the Land Force was the single loading Mourata rifle, invented by a Japanese officer, and manufactured in Japan. The barrel has five shallow grooves. The bullet is hardened, cylindrical, with rounded head and slightly hollowed base, has two cannelures, and is 1\(\frac{1}{8}\) inch long. Its weight is put down as 420 grains, and the powder charge 83 grains, but no doubt there are slight variations, as four bullets which I have weighed are all upwards of the weight stated. The old Mourata rifle has a sword bayonet. The Navy are armed with Sniders. I saw no case of Snider-bullet wound, which is quite unmistakable.

The officers and many of the camp followers carried Japanese swords, and I believe that all who could of the soldiers carried these swords in preference to the regulation weapon of the European model.

The shrapnel fire of the Japanese is said to have been very destructive and very alarming to the Chinese. The Japanese had mountain guns in three sections which were screwed together, as well as field guns. They had also rifle calibre machine guns. They are said to have been somewhat disappointed with the performances of the old Mourata rifle.

Wounds seen at Tientsin.—The wounds seen at Tientsin had been inflicted from twenty-two days (the shortest period) to six months, before the wounded arrived at the Tientsin hospitals. The patients had been able to leave the field and to exist for this length of time, suffering often great hardships and privation. They had had to walk or to find their own transport. They had had no medical treatment on the field. Nevertheless, many wounds had quite healed before their arrival at Tientsin. As might be supposed, those seen were generally superficial, or if a bone had been struck, in the upper extremity. Some bullets passed in the near neighbourhood of vital structures, and in several cases the lung
was wounded. One class of case, however, was conspicuously absent, viz., perforating or penetrating wound of abdomen.

One thing is certain, that a very small proportion of the wounded ever got to Tientsin, and of those likely otherwise to recover, many died by the accidents of frost-bite, exposure and other circumstances. Many were detained in the hospitals at Niu-chwang, some few, no doubt, found their way to their homes. Those that arrived said that many had died on the way.

The wounds were generally made by the old Mourata bullet, which is described. The Japanese were not armed with the new magazine rifle, and only four cases of lodgment of a small-bore bullet were found. But the size of the hole made in the clothes and the size of the wound led me to put down certain wounds as caused by a small-bore bullet, although positive evidence, by the finding of the bullet, had been wanting (the Chinese were latterly, many of them, armed with a repeating small-bore rifle—the Mauser Mannlicher—and some of them may have been accidentally shot by their own side). The old Mourata bullet is toughened, and it makes, in certain parts of the body, a very small wound. In cases which I judged had been inflicted by the small-bore bullet, the wound was a very clean one, and generally healed rapidly. It was impossible to get accurately at the distance at which the patient was from the rifle which wounded him, but some who were very sure about it stated from fifty yards to half a mile. In the aspect of the wound there was very little modification by range. On the whole, the wound made by the .432 old Mourata bore is a favourable one. The bullet alters but little in shape on striking a bone at lodging ranges, and where a bone has been fractured the splitting has been inconsiderable. In the muscles the track left is clean and heals readily. The bullet carries but little before it into the wound, and the hole in the camlet is often merely a split. In the wounds of chest seen, where the lung had been perforated, there was very little sign of mischief when the patients arrived at Tientsin.

It may be interesting and apropos to take the case of one man as representing that of many of the wounded who arrived at Tientsin. This man was wounded at Tapingshan, in Manchuria. He was struck in the arm and the humerus fractured. According to his statement he ran until he could not run any more. He lost a good deal of blood. He dressed his wound as best he could and walked to Kinchow, where his wound was looked to by Dr. Kin. He then got to Shan-hai-kwan, by walking and riding in various carts, and was forwarded by rail to Tientsin. He begged food as
he went, and suffered much from cold and hunger. He suffered a great deal of pain, and when he arrived at Tientsin by rail from Shan-hai-kwan the wound was suppurating and very offensive. He had had no splint, and there was much deformity and swelling. He had fallen in with others and they journeyed together for mutual protection and aid. He had travelled for two months with a fractured arm, a distance of about 250 miles on foot, or in a cart, not counting the railway journey, and only had his wound dressed once. There were many similar cases. During February two or three men came in who had been wounded at Ping-Yang in September! There was no organised means of transport for them, and every man had to shift for himself. The whole country near the scene of operations was in an unsettled state, and very many people, peasants and soldiers, died of famine. It may therefore be seen that to have survived so much hardship was a promising element in those cases that got as far as Tientsin.

Remarks.—The treatment of cases of gunshot wounds by European surgeons on their arrival in hospital consisted in rest and cleanliness, as far as possible. No doubtful interference was attempted. In some cases progress was retarded by climatic fever of a relapsing type, and in one or two a process set in very like hospital gangrene. These were promptly treated and took on a healthy action. Iodine water was most effective in their cure, after free scraping and removal of sloughs. Perchloride of mercury was the staple antiseptic used, and iodoform as an adjunct. There were very few suitable special splints, and when necessary they had to be made. One great drawback to the comfort and safety of the patients was the want of a change of clothing in hospital. They had to lie in the clothes in which they were wounded, which were saturated with foul discharge and crawling with vermin. There were no baths for washing the patients, and the bedding consisted of a grass mat on planks. The food was also insufficient and inappropriate to certain cases. It speaks well for the recuperative powers of the men that they did so well. Very many of the wounds of one month's standing were soundly healed when seen, even in some cases where one of the smaller bones had been fractured.

I think that among the Chinese conservative surgery should be the rule. They all have a very strong objection to amputation, on religious grounds, and in cases where they had been recommended but refused to submit to it, I saw the recovery of the limb take place where it had seemed quite improbable.