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the average orderly. To call it "gadget" is to crown it; "disease spreader" is the only name for it. To prove this: Measure how much of a thermometer goes into the mouth, see the casual wipe given to the instrument, and as it is reintroduced into this receptacle, watch infective saliva being scraped off against the hole in the cover, and note that only half of that portion which was in the mouth ever reaches the antiseptic. Again watch it being taken out for another case; it is rubbed against the side of the hole in the cover, reinfecting itself, and so passing on disease.

English thermometers are not of good design. The outer surface of the glass is scored with graduations marking degrees. These scores can easily become a store-house of infection, and at any rate, when the colour has gone, are difficult to read. The continental pattern, in which the mercury tube is encased in an outer smooth-surfaced one, is obviously cleaner to use. The scale is on a thin celluloid strip which is inserted inside this outer covering, and is therefore always legible.

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Echoes of the Past.

WAR EXPERIENCES OF A TERRITORIAL MEDICAL OFFICER.

By Major-General Sir Richard Luce, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.B., F.R.C.S.

(Continued from p. 353.)

CHAPTER VI.—AUGUST 21.

We soon learned that we had been hurried up to take part in another attempt to win the heights which were shutting us in.

The point of attack was to be Scimitar Hill, or Hill 70, immediately above and behind Green Hill. For the operation there was a reshuffling of troops. The famous 29th Division had been brought up from Helles and was to share the honours of the main attack with the 11th Division. We, the 2nd Mounted Division, were to receive our baptism in immediate support of the attack while the 10th Division was held in reserve. The 53rd and 54th Divisions were holding the left part of the line. The 11th were on the right of Chocolate Hill, the 29th on the left. The time of the attack was fixed at 3 p.m. on the afternoon of August 21. We therefore had two days to grow accustomed to our new surroundings, and to get into position for our share in the operation.

After two days’ rest, peaceful except for an occasional shell by way of reminder from the Turks and for a sharp but ineffectual night attack by them on the front line position on Karakol Dagh, the Division started after dusk on the evening of the 20th to march round the bay to Lala Baba. All heavier equipment and kit was left behind. Our poor little field ambulances which had left Alexandria fully equipped with transport had been ordered to drop it all on reaching Mudros and had come on without any means
Sir Richard Luce

whatever for carrying their medical stores except the stretchers intended for the wounded. With the greatest difficulty at the last moment three mules per field ambulance had been extracted from the authorities to carry some of it but the bulk had to be carried during the long weary night march over the heavy sand by the men themselves.

The distance was only about three and a half miles, but it took a long time in the darkness, and our men, who had been doing hospital work during the summer heat of Egypt, were entirely out of condition. There was not much sleep that night for any of them, tired though they were. The next morning they found themselves bivouacked on the western slope of Lala Baba, shut off from the view of the enemy by its crest, and looking out to sea over the beautiful bay, with the rugged island of Samothrace directly in front and Imbros more distant to the South.

To the South one could see the coast of the Peninsula stretching away past Anzac towards Cape Helles; the peak of the impregnable Achi Baba was just visible in the distance. The view of the coast to the North was shut out by Cape Suvla and the ridge of Karakol, except that on clear days part of the north coast of the Aegean could be seen in the distance.

On exceptional days, of which this was not one, the lofty point of Mount Athos on the Greek coast fully ninety miles away could just be distinguished standing up out of the sea between Samothrace and Imbros. It was a view which became indelibly imprinted on our minds in the months to come when we lived on this same slope, which gradually became a little town of dugouts for the Headquarters of two divisions.

The morning of August 21, 1915, passed peaceably enough except that during the course of it we received a piece of news which fell like a bomb upon us, namely, that we were not to be commanded in our first battle by our own divisional general, General Peyton. General Stopford, who had commanded the 9th Corps up to this time, was superseded and General de Lisle put in command. As General de Lisle was junior to the Commander of the 10th Division, a new temporary commander had to be found for that formation, which was to be in reserve at Lala Baba. To get over the difficulty General Peyton was given joint command of the two divisions and the immediate command of the Second Mounted Division devolved on the senior brigadier, General Paul Kenna, V.C., who had won his cross at Omdurman, and who had a world-wide fame for his jumping ponies. This alteration at the last minute was very upsetting. Most of the senior members of the Staff of the Division remained with General Peyton for the combined command, and a new staff had to be improvised for the 2nd Mounted, partly from the existing staff, and partly from such officers as could be hurriedly selected from the brigades. As far as the general staff side and the fighting control was concerned this did not matter so much, but as regards the administrative side, with which the medical department is most concerned, the alteration made things very difficult. To have to deal with a new staff put together at a moment's notice some
of them with little previous experience of staff work, was disconcerting. It was a little hard that all the months of preparation and co-ordination should be thrown away at the very first moment it was to be put to the test.

The battle began at 2.30 with a great bombardment of the Turkish trenches and gun positions by the field artillery and the warships in the harbour. It lasted half an hour at full intensity, and the Turks made little or no reply. To our inexperienced ears it seemed that it must have completely paralysed the Turkish gunners.

At 3 p.m. the attack was launched from the front line trenches on the right side of Chocolate Hill. At the same moment we rose from our position of assembly behind a low ridge between Lala Baba and Nebruniessi Point and started our march across the mile and a half of open plain between us and Chocolate Hill, so as to be in position there to reinforce the attack or to complete it, if successful. We moved out in successive lines in open order. General Kenna and his staff, which included myself, were in the front line. No better description of the march can be given than that contained in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch of December 11, 1915. He was watching from Karakol Dagh.

"The Second Division moved out from Lala Baba in open formation to take up a position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnul (Chocolate Hill). During this march they came under a remarkably steady and accurate artillery fire.

"The advance of these English yeomen was a sight calculated to send a thrill of pride through anyone with a drop of English blood running in their veins. Ordinarily, it should always be possible to bring up reserves
under some sort of cover from shrapnel fire. Here, for a mile and a half, there was nothing to conceal a mouse, much less some of the most stalwart soldiers England had ever sent from her shores. Despite the critical events in other parts of the field I could hardly take my glasses from the yeomen; they moved like men marching on parade. Here and there a shell would take toll of a cluster, there they lay. There was no straggling, the others moved steadily on, not a man was there who hung back or hurried. But such an ordeal must consume some of the battle-winning fighting energy of those subjected to it, and it is lucky indeed for the Turks that the terrain, as well as the lack of trenches forbade us from letting the 2nd Mounted Division loose at close quarters to the enemy without undergoing this previous too heavy baptism of fire."

The number of casualties that occurred during our march to Chocolate Hill was about two hundred. Our two field ambulances, still without transport except their three mules, marched along in rear of the Division. They had not gone halfway before it was necessary for both of them to open to deal with the casualties, and their hands were soon full. They pitched in the open close to the edge of the Salt Lake. In the meantime the Division had reached comparative safety behind the hill, and were at any rate out of sight from the Turkish gunners. Then came a weary wait before it was decided that the Division should be employed.

The attack of the 11th and 29th Divisions had failed with very heavy losses, and just before dusk it was settled that the 2nd Mounted Division were to make one last effort to convert the failure into a success. The 2nd South Midland Brigade Regiment, under the Earl of Longford, moved out by the left of Chocolate Hill, the 1st South Midland and the London Brigades by the right.

In the meantime, as both of our small field ambulances had become immobilized on the plain nearly a mile back, I had to send urgent messages back for a section from each of them to be sent up to Chocolate Hill, to be in readiness for casualties from the main attack.

The sections arrived in time and were opened under the best cover that could be obtained.

Not very long after the dispatch of the first three brigades, the Notts and Derby Brigade was sent to follow and support the 1st South Midland and the London, leaving only the Herts and Westminsters in reserve.

They all disappeared into the darkness and we waited anxiously for news at Chocolate Hill.

Exactly what happened is little known. On the right the troops got but little beyond our own front line trenches. On the left, led in person by Lord Longford, the Bucks, Berks and Dorset Yeomanry made a gallant dash forward and reached the Turkish front line trenches. At first it was thought that Hill 70 was captured, but the trench was below the crest and they could move forward no further.

After some anxious hours it was decided that what they had gained
could not be held, and a withdrawal to the original line was ordered. It was not long before the casualties began to come in. Steadily through the night the field ambulances worked as hard as they could. As we had no transport of our own we had to rely on the ambulance wagons of the 11th Division, and fortunately were also able to make use of empty vehicles from the supply column, which brought up our rations and water. They were only Indian mule carts, but they served the purpose and we managed to get most of the patients away before dawn. Just before it was light a rumour reached me while working with the field ambulances that the Division had been ordered to return to Lala Baba.

On going up to Headquarters on Chocolate Hill I found that General Kenna and the rest of the staff had already gone back without leaving any word as to the disposal of the field ambulances. Fortunately by this time they were getting nearly empty, though isolated cases were still coming in from the front. I gave orders for the field ambulances to clear as quickly as they could and to withdraw to Lala Baba, leaving a detachment at Chocolate Hill, under the D.A.D.M.S., Major Taylor, to deal with any cases that might still come in; then I tramped back to seek the Divisional Headquarters and find out what was to happen.

It was now daylight but the Turkish gunners had not yet wakened up enough to worry stray travellers. The scrub between Chocolate Hill and the Salt Lake, which had been set on fire by the gunfire the previous afternoon, was still burning, and it is to be feared that some of the severely wounded who fell during the march of the same afternoon may have suffered from this.

On reaching Lala Baba I found that General Kenna and three of the brigades had got back, but what was left of the 2nd South Midland and most of the Notts and Derby had not received their orders in time to enable them to withdraw before daylight. They were therefore to remain at Chocolate Hill for the time being.

Our casualties had been very heavy. Lord Longford was missing and all his staff either wounded or missing. The temporary Commander of the Notts and Derby was wounded. The total casualties for the day were about one thousand two hundred.

After a visit to Number 14 Casualty Clearing Station on the beach to the South of Point Nebruniesi, I started off about noon for Chocolate Hill once more. The remains of the 2nd South Midland Brigade with the Notts and Derby had gathered there and were digging themselves into shelter. The section of the 2nd South Midland Field Ambulance which had been left behind, was able to cope with such casualties as were still coming in. After completing arrangements for evacuation, I returned again to Headquarters at Lala Baba.

On reaching there I learned that orders had been received for the whole Division to go back to Chocolate Hill after dark that night and remain there in reserve. About 8 p.m., therefore, we started off once more over the same
old ground, this time in brilliant moonlight. But the distance was too
great for the Turks to see us and not a shot was fired at us. We did not
worry much about our quarters that night but slept the sleep we had
earned after forty-eight hours continuous strain.

The next few days was a time of considerable discomfort. The Turks
shelled us continually and we took some time to dig ourselves in to any-
thing like safety. Our valises, mess kit and servants did not reach us for
another two days.

Chocolate Hill was very overcrowded. There were a number of other
troops, belonging to the 11th Division, mixed up with us and the sanitary
conditions of the place were appalling. Major Taylor and a specially
appointed commandant got to work cleaning up, and after a time some sort

![Sea Cliff, Lala Baba.](image)

of order was obtained. Very soon the flies began to swarm upon us, and
were quickly followed by the appearance of diarrhoea of a dysenteric nature.
One of our medical officers was evacuated with dysentery on September 3,
and died a few days later on his way to Malta.

For the first few days all the water we got was half a gallon per man,
brought up to us from a special water ship. Having come all the way from
Alexandria, it was of a rich brown colour and very unpalatable.

Gradually the engineers got to work and developed some of the numerous
wells that had been discovered and the water supply began to improve.
There was plenty of good water on the plain, and it only wanted developing
and protecting from contamination.

Unfortunately we could obtain no bleaching powder for purifying the
water, or other disinfectants. Before leaving Alexandria, after urgent representations had been made, the Division had been fully equipped in this respect, but as all such supplies had been taken from us at Mudros with our water carts, there was now none to be had.

During our stay at Chocolate Hill there was a steady, daily list of casualties from shell fire and stray bullets which one day reached the figure of sixty.

The 29th Division was withdrawn soon after August 21, and replaced by the 10th Division, and a few days later we took over the line of trenches held by the 11th Division, extending from Green Hill southwards to join up with the Anzac position. Any idea of another attempt with the existing force was abandoned, and things settled down to trench warfare.

On September 5, Divisional Headquarters moved back to the comparative comfort of Lala Baba. A little village of dugouts was prepared on the western slope facing the sea, and there we remained for the next four months, until the evacuation.

Chapter VII.—Life at Suvla.

Early in September the Division, now much reduced by casualties, was reinforced by the Scottish Horse Brigade who had come out from England, dismounted, under the command of the Marquis of Tullibardine. They brought with them a most excellent field ambulance, but this unit—like our own—arrived without transport.

On September 26, came the Highland Mounted Brigade, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Lovat Scouts and the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, commanded by Lord Lovat himself; they also brought their field ambulance. These were most welcome additions to the fast diminishing strength of the Division.

The Scottish Horse Brigade was drawn from the east and centre of Scotland. The Highland Brigade, with the exception of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, were real Highlanders. Many of the men coming from the Western Isles spoke only Gaelic.

The personnel of these two brigades were magnificent men physically and the clan feeling was strongly marked in them, more so probably than in any unit in the whole Army. In peace times there had been considerable rivalry between the two brigades, which once, on the occasion of a combined Field Day, had almost resulted in a blood feud, but now in the presence of a common foe and with the Sassenach looking on, there was no revival of antagonism and their relations with one another and with the rest of the Yeomanry were throughout most harmonious. The Scottish Horse contained in their ranks many gillies, who made most excellent snipers and found considerable scope for their skill with the telescope and the rifle.

I remember on one occasion when going round their trenches with their Brigadier, Lord Tullibardine, being allowed to look down the telescope.
of one of these marksmen gillies, probably one of his lordship's own retainers. I was shown a life-sized Turk, visible from his waist upwards over the top of the Turkish trench some two hundred yards away. I inquired why they did not shoot him and was told that they were saving him up as they hoped to learn from his movements the whereabouts of a trench mortar which had been causing considerable trouble.

The 2nd South Midland Field Ambulance moved from Chocolate Hill to the beach south of Nebrunessi Point on September 5, leaving an advanced dressing station halfway between them and the right of our line. The London Field Ambulance moved to the same locality on September 24, leaving only an advanced dressing station at Chocolate Hill. The Scottish Horse Field Ambulance had already opened on the beach, so that when they were joined by the Highland Field Ambulance on September 26, all our medical units were thus concentrated in this one area which was continuous with that occupied by the 14th Casualty Clearing Station and the field ambulances of the 53rd and 10th Divisions. This beach came to be reserved for medical units, and from the distance presented a continuous line of tents with Red Cross flags at intervals marking the individual units spaced out along the line.

This area was in full view of the Turks, and was, generally speaking, respected by them. The hospitals were shelled on one or two occasions, but always for some special reason; once, when an aeroplane descended on the margin of the sea just in front of the hospital and once when the too zealous Welsh Field Ambulances held a massed Church Service Parade in front of their camp. The Turks also shelled our hospitals on the occasion 29
when our Naval friends, with a direct hit, knocked down the minaret of the mosque in the village of Anafarta.

By the beginning of October the sick rate of the Division was giving considerable anxiety. The number of men admitted to hospital in the Division, which under normal conditions should not exceed 2.1 per cent. per week, had been 8.5, 7.3 and 12.8 for the weeks ending September 18, 25, and October 2 respectively. Only a small proportion of these could be returned fit for duty, the remainder had to be evacuated through the Casualty Clearing Station by hospital ship to Egypt and Malta. Besides this a large number of men were being treated in the trenches by the regimental medical officers and were not fit for any strenuous work.

By far the largest number of sick were suffering from dysentery or diarrhoea, which was probably dysenteric.

Septic sores had also again broken out and were causing much disability. A careful inquiry and consideration of the cases made it pretty certain that the water supply was not the main cause of the intestinal infection, but that it must be put down to flies and dust, chiefly probably to the former. The flies were now terrible; every latrine, every refuse pit and every grave was turning out a persistent stream of house or blue-bottle flies. There was still no proper supply of disinfectants to check the breeding, and it was impossible to substitute any other system of conservancy for the open trench owing to the lack of ordnance buckets for the construction of latrines and fuel for the incineration of excreta. It had not yet been properly realized that in trench warfare in a confined area, especially in a hot climate,
no system is satisfactory for the prevention of fly breeding which does not enable incineration of all refuse to be carried out. Obviously a landing force cannot take all the necessary sanitary appliances with it, but these should have been ready to follow the troops as soon as the immediate landing was accomplished. These lessons were well learned in Egypt a year later, and never again was the Army subjected to such insanitary conditions.

As regards water, it has already been stated that for the first few days all the drinking water was brought by ship, but later, when ample water was found and developed, there were few facilities for protection and none for disinfection. The system of sterilization by chlorine which had been worked out with such care by Colonel Horrocks at the beginning of the War, by which any water can be made safe for drinking by the addition of a small amount of bleaching powder, was stultified here by the failure to provide the troops with the necessary powder or with receptacles in which to store the water. In the case of our own Division, every effort had been made to ensure such provision before leaving Egypt. We came away fully equipped with water carts, each containing a supply of bleaching powder sufficient to last some weeks. When we reached Mudros, without reference to the medical authorities all the water carts were taken from us with their priceless stock of powder and shipped back to Egypt with the rest of our transport. One cannot help feeling that in the preparation for this operation sufficient consideration was not given to its medical and sanitary aspects, just as had been the case in the matter of the transports at the time of the earlier landing. It is well known that troops must take big medical risks to bring off a big surprise, but it is essential that the necessary medical details must be thought out and the equipment made ready beforehand, so that it can be hurried up with the least possible delay at the first pause after the immediate attack, whether this is successful or the reverse. It was more than two months after the landing at Suvla before proper trench stores and disinfectants, so absolutely necessary for the health of troops in this kind of warfare, were forthcoming, and even then they were provided in totally insufficient quantities.

The ignorance and lack of training of the troops in sanitary discipline, referred to earlier, were of course partly to blame. It was difficult to get trench latrines dug regularly and kept properly covered by men who had not done these things for themselves as a matter of routine beforehand. In fact, the heavy sick rate at Suvla during the early months was due to a failure of sanitation which would not have occurred with the same troops two years later, with the backing from Headquarters which was then given.

It can be safely said, I think, that scarcely an individual went through his time at Suvla, if it lasted more than a week or two, without some touch of dysentery.

The food was good in quality throughout, but field rations at their best are not exactly suitable diet for men suffering from intestinal disorders.
Besides dysentery and septic sores, there was a good deal of fever, the cause of which was never exactly discovered, though no doubt some of it was due to paratyphoid and in the later months there was an epidemic of jaundice which appeared to be infectious and was very debilitating in its result. With the onset of colder weather at the end of October and the disappearance of flies, the health of the men began to improve and continued fair until the terrible setback which occurred as the result of the storm on November 26.

At the end of October, the whole of the remaining troops of the original Division, about one thousand men, were sent away to rest at Mudros where a camp had been prepared for them by our D.A.D.M.S., Major Taylor, who went over there a week in advance to get things ready. Half the number left on October 31 and the remainder on November 2. Rest and recuperation was the object in view, but owing to subsequent change of plans they never came back. The London Field Ambulance went at the same time and with them disappeared all that was left of the original five thousand, except one field ambulance and a few members of the Headquarters Staff, who had by no means escaped their toll of sickness during the two and a half months at Suvla.

To make up the strength of the Division, a brigade of the 53rd Welsh Territorial Division was lent to us, which took its turn of duty in the trenches at the right of the line, and on November 16 we were joined by the South Western Yeomanry Brigade, consisting of the Somerset and Devonshire Yeomanry. Their field ambulance which came with them to Suvla was never transferred to the 2nd Mounted Division, but was used in connexion with Number 26 Casualty Clearing Station at Suvla Point.

(To be continued.)

Current Literature.


(i) The existence of mosquitoes, particularly Aedes aegypti, in aircraft having been demonstrated, appropriate methods of destruction must be discovered. This apparently simple problem is complicated by the necessity for fumigation at ports of call, immediately before departure, or during flight. Hydrogen-cyanide cannot be considered in the face of these