

The speed of induction is under complete control and in practice it has been found that from five to ten cubic centimetres of ethyl chloride so administered will give from two to four minutes of complete anæsthesia.

Recovery of consciousness is complete in a few minutes and no untoward effects have so far been noted.

Although it is impossible to be certain that similar appliances are not in everyday use, none such has come to our notice, and the apparatus described above has been arrived at by experiment from materials available to all.

The authors are indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Wells, D.S.O., R.A.M.C., Officer Commanding British Military Hospital (with Indian Wing), Mingaladon, Burma, for permission to forward these notes for publication.

Echoes of the Past.

WAR EXPERIENCES OF A TERRITORIAL MEDICAL OFFICER.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR RICHARD LUCE, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.B., F.R.C.S.

(Continued from p. 65.)

CHAPTER XVIII.—THE CAPTURE OF SHERIA AND GAZA.

THE scheme for the second phase of the operation was as follows :—

The 53rd Division was temporarily attached to the Desert Mounted Corps whose commander became responsible for the protection of the right flank.

The 74th, 60th and 10th Divisions were to attack the Kauwukap trench system, placed in this order from right to left.

The 74th Division was to begin the operation by an attack on the extreme left flank of the enemy with one brigade making the direction of their attack parallel to the line of the trenches. The other two brigades were to be echeloned on the right flank to meet any counter attack from the north-west.

During the attack by the 74th Division on the trenches to the east of the railway the 60th and 10th Divisions were to move forward to cover suitable positions from which their artillery could make the preliminary bombardment of the Kauwukah system.

As soon as the 74th Division reached the railway, the 60th and 10th were to deliver their attack on the main position west of the railway.


Only one brigade of the 10th Division was to be employed in the attack the other two being held in corps reserve.

Once the Kauwukap system was taken it was intended that the 74th

Division, assisted if necessary by the 60th, should push on northwards and secure the high ground to the north of Sheria commanding the water supply at that place.

The medical arrangements for this phase were as follows :—

The three casualty clearing stations and the Egyptian hospital remained as before at Imara.



It will be seen by a glance at the map that the Kauwukap system is nearer to Imara than Beersheba is. To evacuate wounded via Beersheba involved a journey round two sides of a triangle. The direct route was, however, little known; it was directly under observation from Kauwukap for a good part of its length and it had not been possible to reconnoitre further than the Wadi Hannafish before the attack on Beersheba. This route was therefore explored in a motor car on November 4 and found practicable by crossing the Wadi Hannafish at Bir Imleh. The crossing required, however, some work on it to make it passable for motor ambulances, and for this purpose the R.E. detailed fifty Egyptian Labour Corps men. It was then arranged that this route should be used for evacuation from the 64th, 60th, and 10th Divisions.

Evacuation from the 53rd Division, now attached to the Desert Corps, was still carried on via the hospital at Beersheba to Imara, for which purpose the whole of the twenty-one motor ambulances were handed over to the Division. During the operation these were placed at the disposal of the A.D.M.S. who was responsible for the evacuation of the casualties right up to the casualty clearing stations. The seventeen motor

ambulances of the 35th M.A. Convoy attached to the 20th Corps were to assist on whatever route they were most needed.

Corps Headquarters remained at Beersheba during this phase.

The tracks east of the Gaza-Beersheba road were none of them suitable for motor ambulances ; it was therefore decided to bring casualties to the Gaza-Beersheba road by camels and sand carts, and from there on by motor ambulance. The 60th and 74th Divisions therefore placed sections of field ambulances on the road near Irgeig to act as transfer posts. The journey from the right of the 74th Division to Irgeig was a lonely and difficult one.

The 10th Division was able to evacuate across the Wadi Hannafish at Bir Ifteis in the later stages, and this further shortened the route.

The attack took place on the morning of November 6 as arranged. The 74th met with considerable opposition and had heavy losses, but eventually overcame the enemy's resistance and made their way to the railway. Once this was done the 60th and 10th made their attack on Kauwukap and took it without great difficulty. It appeared afterwards that this position had not been seriously held by infantry. When I examined the position next day there were few signs of the trenches having been occupied except by machine guns.

As the 74th had a heavy fight and the 60th only a light one, by an alteration of the programme it was decided that the 60th should take over the work of attacking Sheria. After a rapid re-organization they moved north against this position. The Turks put up a strong resistance and the place was not finally taken until the morning of the 7th.

Meanwhile the work of evacuation was proceeding slowly. On the 6th it became obvious that there was going to be a considerable congestion of wounded on the Gaza-Beersheba road at Irgeig. It was, therefore, decided to move the 53rd Immobile Field Ambulance from Imara to that point. This unit arrived with all available tentage about seven o'clock a.m. on the 7th and took over the cases there, leaving the field ambulances of the 74th and 60th Divisions free to rejoin their divisions.

It was found impossible to get all the cases away from Irgeig direct by motor ambulance to Imara, so it was decided to make use of supply wagons and lorries returning from the divisions to Beersheba for light cases ; some hundreds were evacuated in this way and passed through the hospital at Beersheba. Lying cases continued to be sent by motor ambulances direct to Imara across the Wadi Hannafish.

On the morning of the 7th, the 60th Division was transferred to the Desert Corps which was now detailed to act as a flying column in pursuit of the retreating Turks. At the same time the 10th Division moved along the Gaza-Beersheba road and attacked Hareira, the next post towards Gaza on the Turkish line of defence. It was a strong natural position defended with numerous machine guns and supported by artillery, but it fell after a sharp fight.

The enemy's old flank was now broken and crumpled. They had, it is true, diverted a fairly strong force on to the Hebron road, but there was a wide gap between this and the still intact part of the Gaza defences.

The 21st Corps, meanwhile, had been putting increased pressure on Gaza itself. With their left flank now open to attack, the Turks decided to withdraw from the town. This they managed to do without immediate disaster on the evening of the 6th. The 21st and Desert Corps at once set out in pursuit. The 60th Division (attached to the Desert Corps) moved forward to Huj on the 9th, but it soon became obvious that they could not keep up with the mounted troops and they reverted to the command of the 20th Corps.

By instruction from G.H.Q. all available transport was now turned over to the Desert and 21st Corps to enable them to carry on the pursuit, and by the withdrawal of a large portion of its transport, the 20th Corps was left practically immobile.

The 74th and 10th Divisions were ordered back to railhead at Karm on the 9th, while the 60th remained for a few days in the Huj area to collect the prisoners and booty and then withdraw to Sheria. The 53rd Division, which had reverted to the 20th Corps command after the battle, still held a line covering Kauwukap and remained in touch with the enemy who held the Hebron road.

One hundred and seventy wounded Turks were found at Sheria and we had to send eight motor ambulances to assist Desert Corps in bringing them in.

CHAPTER XIX.—THE PURSUIT OF THE TURKS AND PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK ON JERUSALEM.

At the end of the last chapter it was shown how the 20th Corps, by the removal of its mechanical transport, was left immobile. During the next fortnight, therefore, we took no active part in the operations except that the 53rd Division remained more or less in touch with the Turkish Force on the Hebron Road, north of Beersheba. The 10th and 74th Divisions were refitting at Karm, and the 60th was collecting prisoners, guns and ammunition abandoned by the Turks round Sheria.

The retreat of the Turks was rapid but fairly orderly. During the summer they had prepared a line of defence just south of Ramleh, on which to fall back in case of need. This line included Latrun and the high ground behind it, and the hills on the opposite side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road. In their retreat along the coast the Turks were driven past their prepared line and were never able to occupy it. Ramleh and Ludd were occupied by us on November 15; the line to Jerusalem had been cut the day before.

The town of Jaffa, on the coast, fell into our hands on November 17 and the enemy did not stop in his retreat along the coast until he reached the River Auja. Further inland he took up a position on the line of the

old Roman road from Jaffa to Jerusalem, running through Beit Ur el Tahta and Beit Ur el Foka, the Methar and Upper Beth Horons of the Bible.

The Commander-in-Chief, content with having reached Ludd, decided to try and make good a line eastwards from this point to Bireh on the Nablus road, nine miles north of Jerusalem, and if possible secure that city without fighting in the immediate vicinity of the town itself.

With this object, while holding the line of the Auja with the mounted troops and the 54th Division, he struck eastwards with the other two divisions of the 21st Corps, the 52nd and 75th, across the Judean hills, endeavouring to reach the Nablus road north of Jerusalem and thus cut off the city and its garrison from communication with the north.

It had been originally intended to wait until the 20th Corps could be brought up and to make this move north-eastwards with them, while the 21st Corps held the enemy in the coastal section, but the flight of the Turks and the capture of Jaffa decided him to lose no time but to make a bold push for possession of the Nablus road with the troops already at his disposal.

The two divisions moved east on parallel roads; the 52nd, by the Roman road which crosses the head of the valley of Ajalon at Beit Likia and passes over the hills through Beit Anam and Kubeibeh; the 75th, by the modern main road from Jaffa to Jerusalem through Kuryet el Enab, the Kirjath Jearim of the Bible.

The first of these roads was nothing but a mountain track, over which guns and wheeled vehicles could only be taken after the expenditure of much labour; the second was a well engineered metalled road, but at this time in bad condition and with several culverts destroyed by the retreating enemy.

The two divisions pushed on until they reached Kubeibeh and Enab respectively. A few miles beyond Kubeibeh the Turks were concentrated in a strong position of which Nebi Samwil, a hill nearly three thousand feet high, was the central point. The southern division reached Enab and was faced there by the western defences of Jerusalem itself.

Nebi Samwil, according to Moslem tradition, is the site of the tomb of the Prophet Samuel. It is of the greatest importance historically and strategically. The "*Mons Gaudii*" of the pilgrims, it is the point at which in travelling from Jaffa by the old route, they obtained their first view of the Holy City. It is the place, in all probability, if the story is a true one, at which Richard Cœur de Lion covered his face that he might not look upon the holy place which he was not permitted to rescue from the enemies of Christianity and never actually reached. It is also, most probably, the "*Mizpah*" of the Old Testament, "the place of observation," one of the centres visited annually in circuit by the Prophet Samuel to judge the people and the place where he proclaimed Saul the first King of Israel before the assembled multitude.

Strategically—it is the key to the capture of Jerusalem, in an advance

from the south and west. The only possible line of communications between Jerusalem and the north is along the Nablus road. This road runs almost due north and south along the ridge which divides the watersheds draining respectively into the Mediterranean and into the Jordan and the Dead Sea. The only communication for wheeled vehicles between Jerusalem and Eastern Palestine is by the Jericho road. This road crosses the Valley of the Kedron immediately outside the town, skirts the south end of the Mount of Olivés, and after passing through Bethany makes a difficult and abrupt drop of one thousand feet in less than six miles towards the Jordan Valley.

Nebi Samwil commands direct observation of a large section of the Nablus road at a distance of five thousand yards. Owing to the rapid fall of the ground on the eastern side of the road, and the rugged nature of the ground, there is no alternative route to the north. The single line of communications by the Jericho road is not sufficient for a force holding Jerusalem. Amman, the nearest point on the Hedjaz railway, which runs down the extreme eastern border of the country, is nearly eighty miles away. The road leading there is metalled and fit for lorries in fine weather, but it has to cross the Jordan Valley, the bed of which is four thousand feet below the high ground on either side.

Moreover, were the ridge on which the Nablus Road runs once held by an invading force, the command of the Jericho road would probably be obtained.

The natural defences of Jerusalem from the west and south are exceedingly strong and the Turks had developed them well, but with Nebi Samwil lost, Jerusalem would be shut off from the north and its garrison, unable to get supplies, would be forced to surrender. However, for the time being, Nebi Samwil proved too much for the tired 52nd Division, who failed to carry it in the rush.

The 75th Division, too, was held up at Enab and lost heavily. More than one attempt was made to take Nebi Samwil. The 52nd Division was reinforced, both from the 75th and by mounted troops from the Desert Corps, but without avail. They succeeded in reaching the top of the hill, but could not drive the Turks off it. The two lines remained facing one another at a few yards' distance.

It is not surprising that the mosque over the reputed tomb of the prophet, situated as it was between the opposing forces, like so many of the churches in France, suffered considerably and lost its minaret. The two divisions had suffered heavy casualties and the weather having become very wet and cold the men became exhausted and there was a good deal of sickness. It became obvious, therefore, that Jerusalem could not be taken without a more deliberate operation with fresh troops, and it was decided not to make any further move until the 20th Corps arrived.

The Headquarters of 20th Corps was left at Beersheba with one division, the 53rd, in touch with a force of the enemy covering Hebron,

the 60th clearing up the spoils round Sheria and the 10th and 74th refitting at Karm. On November 17 the scheme for the forward move of the 20th Corps was issued.

The 53rd and the regiment of Corps Cavalry were temporarily detached under Major-General Mott, G.O.C. of the 53rd, to act directly under G.H.Q. They remained covering Beersheba, with orders to advance later northwards to Jerusalem, via Hebron. The 10th and 74th were to move to Deir el Belah on the 17th, and the 60th to the area north of Gaza on November 18. Corps Headquarters moved from Beersheba to the Red House on the Wadi Ghuzzeh, between Belah and Gaza, on the 18th. The whole Corps, less the 53rd Division, was thus concentrated round Gaza and ready to move forward into Palestine.

Before we left Beersheba it was arranged that the 53rd Field Ambulance Immobile section at Irgeig should move into Beersheba to take over the hospital, relieving the 60th and 74th sections which were to rejoin their divisions. The 10th Immobile section was at the same time to rejoin its division from Imara.

These moves took place on November 20.

Owing to the length of line of communication, the 21st and Desert Corps were now beginning to have difficulties with their evacuation. On November 19, under G.H.Q. orders, fifteen of our motor ambulances were handed over to them and the 32nd Field Ambulance of the 10th Division was sent up to open on the line of evacuation at Junction Station, where the Beersheba line joins the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.

The move forward of the 20th Corps began on November 21, with the transfer of Headquarters from Red House, just south of Gaza, to Junction Station.

The Turkish railway to Gaza had never been completed. As mentioned before, it had been constructed during the previous summer from the rails taken up from the line south of Beersheba, but, whether from shortage of materials or for tactical reasons, it had only been brought as far as Beit Hanuni, about five miles north of Gaza. It joined the Beersheba line, five miles south of Junction Station. In their retreat the Turks had not been able to do any serious damage to the line. They got most of their rolling stock away, but we managed to secure two locomotives and about thirty trucks. The latter had been a good deal knocked about by shell fire, and though full of ventilation holes, were still usable.

20th Corps Headquarters made one of the first trips on this line under British auspices in the move to Junction Station. It was an adventurous night journey; twenty officers were packed into a single guards' van. It was just possible for all of us to lie down by sandwiching like sardines with heads and tails alternate ways. The distance was less than thirty miles, and the journey, which lasted ten hours, was not without incident. The train was divided into two portions, the front half containing supplies, the rear half the Headquarters personnel and their equipment. The officers'

van was last but one, and their batmen and kits were in the last. There was an engine at each end. Some time in the course of the night there was a bang followed by a succession of bumps, and the train came to a stop. After a good deal of palaver outside, we were told that owing to a little misunderstanding with the points the front part of the train had run off the line into a field, but that our part was still on rail, and that without much delay we should be drawn off and taken on by the rear engine. We lay still, and after a considerable amount of waiting and shunting we started once more. At a later period we woke from the troubled sleep into which we had fallen to realize that we were moving with very uncomfortable oscillations and at a very rapid rate, in fact it seemed very much as if we were running away. Afterwards it transpired that owing to faulty brakes, this had really been the case, but we reached the bottom of the hill without mishap.

Just before dawn we reached our destination. The train came to a stop and the engine moved off to refresh itself. Unfortunately, the fact that we were on an incline was overlooked, and the train began to move backwards. This time we did not take the comparatively safe route by which we had come, but by a change of points ran on to the branch towards Jaffa. Now on this line, about five hundred yards from the station, was a wadi, the bridge over which had been blown up by one of our enterprising sappers a few days before, little thinking that the first train that would want to cross it would contain the Headquarters Staff of the 20th Corps. The train did not move rapidly for the gradient was not steep, but shortly there was once more a crash and a grinding, and we came to a stop. It was still dark and we were too closely packed to get up unless the emergency was great, but this time we were persuaded by the noise outside to turn out and see what had happened. We found that the rear carriage, in which were our batmen and our kits, though still attached to our own coach, was hanging at a dangerous angle over the edge of the broken bridge. Fortunately, it had become jammed there, so that it was not likely to precipitate itself into the wadi below and no harm had been done. Needless to say, those of the Headquarters Staff who had motor cars at their disposal did not take part in this adventure.

The 60th Division began its march forward from Gaza on the 21st and passed through Junction Station on the 23rd.

The 74th Division moved on the 24th.

At this time 21st Corps, with headquarters at Kubab, was holding the right portion of the line, and Desert Corps, with headquarters south of Ramleh, the left.

The A.D.M.S., G.H.Q., Major Bagshaw, was at Junction Station, controlling the evacuation of casualties from both corps. There were considerable numbers coming down and transport to the nearest casualty clearing station at Gaza was difficult.


On the 24th another field ambulance, of the 10th Division, was moved up and stationed at Beit Hanun, the termination of the Turkish railway.

The 10th Division left Belah on the 27th.

The 60th Division moved up to Enab on the 26th and relieved the 75th and 52nd Divisions on the line extending from Enab, through Nebi Samwil to Kubeibeh, Nebi Samwil forming the apex of a salient.

On the 28th the 60th Division drove off an attack by the enemy and for the moment the 52nd Division was retained in the line. A brigade of the 74th was then moved up between the 60th and 52nd Divisions.

The Headquarters 20th Corps now took over control of the right part of the line from the 21st Corps, retaining the 52nd under its control, and moved from Junction Station to the monastery at Latrun where the road from Junction Station joins the Jerusalem-Jaffa road.



20th Corps Headquarters—Monastery at Latrun.

Latrun is an interesting place. Formerly a caravanserai on the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, it is built on the west slope of a small conical hill which projects out into the valley. It was then the halting place for all tourists on their way from Jaffa to Jerusalem. With the advent of the railway to Jerusalem it fell on less prosperous times and was bought by a Trappist fraternity who converted it into a monastery. They planted extensive gardens and vineyards and, as Trappists are wont, devoted themselves to agriculture and wine production in a fairly big way. The house was added to and made quite comfortable. During the War, the monks, who were mostly French, were turned out and the establishment converted into an agricultural college. While the Turks were retreating the monastery was looted by the Arabs of the neighbouring village and much damage was done to the chapel and library. Many of the doors were removed and the woodwork destroyed. The books of the library were heaped up in a cellar and suffered considerable damage. Knocked about though it was, it did not form a bad headquarters; in fact it was the most civilized place we had occupied since leaving Egypt. My own office was in the dairy among an

assortment of quite up-to-date cheese presses. On the top of the hill above the monastery stands the ruin of a fine old mediæval castle, probably the very place mentioned in Joinville's account of the Crusade of St. Louis as having been originally a fort of the Maccabees. Louis debated the advisability of fortifying it but decided that it was too far from the coast to be held safely at that time when only the coast towns were in the possession of the Christians.

The Army had now reached a part of the country teeming with historical interest. Unfortunately, in the absence of permanent ruins, it is difficult to identify localities with certainty, but in the Old Testament we have a history so full of vivid detail that the general location of the scenes of the more important events are recognizable, even when the exact sites are no longer known.

The route we had taken after leaving Gaza was along the maritime plain known as Shephelah or Philistia in the Old Testament. This plain is about fifteen to twenty miles broad and is separated from the sea by a line of sand dunes of varying width which runs all along the coast. On the east it is bounded by the lower slopes of the Judean Hills. It is a fertile corn-bearing land with a soil of brown loam almost impassable for wheels in wet weather, but which soon dries in the sun into a firm cake and then makes a good surface for motors and other wheeled vehicles. Along this plain have passed during the world's history countless hosts of invaders. It is, and has ever been, the highway from Asia to Africa. From the time of the invasion of the land of the Hittites (sixteenth century B.C.) by Tothmes I, Pharaoh of Egypt, whose conquests are recorded on the walls of the Temple of Karnak, down to the present day, there has been a constant succession of marchings and counter marchings. Two at least of the greatest soldiers of the world's history, Alexander and Napoleon, have taken this road. It was fascinating to sit, as I did one afternoon, for an idle hour on the hill above Latrun, scored with the trenches which the Turks had prepared, and looking out on the plain stretching south and west, to muse on all that had happened there. In front to the south was the road leading to Junction Station and to Gaza. To the right, about five miles away, perched on an outlying hill, lies the village of Abu Shusheh, once the Canaanite town of Gezer. It was never conquered by Joshua, and only came into the possession of the Israelites on the occasion of Solomon's marriage to the daughter of the reigning Pharaoh as part of her dowry. In crusading times it was for long the headquarters of Saladin. Further to the right, showing up white among the green patches of orange orchards, is the modern town of Ramleh with the fine old crusading tower just visible. Almost continuous with Ramleh, and hardly visible among the trees is Ludd, the Lydda of the New Testament, famed for its association with St. Peter and later with our English patron saint, St. George of Cappadocia, who is reputed to have been buried there. Further on still is the line of yellow sand dunes separating the green of the orange groves

from the blue of the Mediterranean which forms the horizon. Among the sand dunes could just be distinguished the town of Jaffa, the so-called "port of Jerusalem," the Joppa of the Bible. Here it was that Solomon landed the timber for the Temple, floated down as rafts from the Lebanon coast. Here also it was that St. Peter had the dream which so much influenced the spread of Christianity to the Gentiles. It is the place, too, where countless visitors and pilgrims have first set their foot on the Holy Land. So much for what could be seen.

Not far away, but out of sight, are the modern Jewish villages which represent the ancient Philistine cities—Akir or Ekron the nearest, further off Esduda or Ashdod. Askalon on the coast retains its name, and of course most southerly of all Gaza. Gath has disappeared.

To the left, looking south one can see the beginning of the valley of Sorak, up which the railway now runs to Jerusalem, taking its name from Surah or Zorah, a village a mile or two further up which was the birth-place of Samson. The Book of Judges relates how he was taken back there by his people after his death at Gaza for burial near his old home. It was in some of these Philistine towns that the Ark of the Lord, captured in the time of Eli, made its resting places so uncomfortable for inhabitants that they were glad to pass it on to their neighbour, and eventually to send it back, up the valley of Sorak, to the nearest Israelite town, Bethshemesh, where again it brought such ill-fortune that it was sent on to Kirjath Jearim, the Khuryet el Enab of to-day. There it remained till it was taken in triumph to Jerusalem by King David.

The thought of the vicissitudes of the Ark during its captivity recalls an interesting theory which has been suggested, by whom I know not, to explain the extraordinary "guilt offerings" placed in the Ark by the Philistines before its return to the Israelites (1 Samuel vi. 4).

The Authorized Version of the Old Testament states that the disease which the Ark carried in its train and which dealt such terrible destruction to its possessors, was the non-infectious and homely one of "emerods" or "hæmorrhoids" and calls the effigies which were inserted in the Ark "golden emerods." In the revised version for the word "emerod" has been substituted the word "tumour" in both places, and the theory is that the disease which followed the Ark was not piles but bubonic plague, in which one of the symptoms is the formation of tumours or buboes on the patient.

Another most interesting point in the story is that side by side with the five gold tumours they placed in the Ark five gold mice. Now it has been discovered in recent years that bubonic plague is conveyed to man by the bite of a flea infected previously by biting a rat suffering from the disease—that without rats there is no plague. The association between the plague and the rat was certainly known in the Middle Ages, for many readers will remember the well-known picture of the "Plague of Ashdod" in the National Gallery by Nicolas Poussin, 1594-1665, in which the rat forms so

prominent a feature. It is suggested that the Philistines had already traced some connection between the mouse or rat and the plague and had recorded it in this way.

In contemplating one's more immediate surroundings one wondered whether the thirty-six odd centuries that have passed since the time of our first historical record had brought much change to the scene. There is little doubt that the country was formerly more populous, while the remains of terraces on the hillside show that cultivation was more complete in earlier times. One could not help trying to visualize the difference in the uniform and modes of transport of the armies of the ancient days. Did they, one wondered, water their horses as we were doing at troughs by the side of the far-famed well of Latrun? Did they have horse lines where we now have them? Did they park their war chariots in neat lines as we do our motor lorries? Was there a supply dump stacked with bales of compressed chopped straw or tibbin, used so much as fodder? Tibbin, we know there was, for it was the lack of it that caused so much trouble to the Israelites in making their bricks when it ceased to be a government supply, but probably it was not then compressed into neat bales bound up with iron bands! We may at least be assured that they did not hear the whirring in the sky which made us look up anxiously to see if the bird-like apparition had a black cross, or red, white and blue rings on its breast. Nor did they hear the whistle and tang of the descending bomb. War in those days must have confined itself pretty well to set battles. If one could have looked over the hill a mile or so behind one's point of observation, on a certain day some three thousand three hundred years ago, one might have seen a stream of fugitives fleeing down the valley from the passes of Beth Horon just above, into the plain of Ajalon. It was all that remained of the hosts of the five kings pursued by the army of Joshua during that long-drawn-out afternoon on which the sun stood still (Joshua x. 13). One would have heard no boom of artillery or rattle of musketry and machine guns. The only rattle would have been that of the hailstones, for the account says that: *They were more which died with hailstones than they whom the children of Israel slew with the sword.* But there would have been the same dead, wounded and prisoners to be accounted for after the battle and the same transference of power from one race to another as its result. There was not, however, much time for musings and Jerusalem had not yet fallen.

(To be continued.)
