

On scrutinizing the man's medical history sheet later, the following extracts which bore on the subject were noted :—

Tonsillitis, 1934. In hospital 111 days. Complicated by extrasystolic and presystolic murmur. Discharged for observation. 1935: Passed fit for service at home and abroad.

Points of interest are: Apparent lack of any symptoms until his hospital treatment in 1934. Apparent lack of physical signs, so that he was "passed fit" in 1935. The extreme rarity of coronary occlusion following rheumatic endocarditis. The extreme rarity of sudden death from coronary occlusion at his age. The unusual site of infection. The original finding of a presystolic murmur in a case of aortic stenosis.

Finally, since aortic stenosis is well known to be frequently missed owing to the vagueness of the symptoms, the interesting fact that when a definite symptom did appear it was a fatal one.

Echoes of the Past.

WAR EXPERIENCES OF A TERRITORIAL MEDICAL OFFICER.

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(Continued from p. 132.)

CHAPTER XX.—THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM.

PREPARATIONS proceeded busily for the next operation which was to involve the capture of Jerusalem itself. With the taking over of the right part of the line by the 20th Corps a readjustment of the troops was necessitated in order that the divisions might be in their proper positions to carry out the scheme of operation. This readjustment was made gradually as the divisions came up. The remaining brigades of the 74th were moved into the line; when the 10th Division arrived on December 1 it at once replaced the 52nd which came out of the line and reverted to the 21st Corps. Two brigades of the Australian Division filled the gap between the 20th and 21st Corps. The headquarters of the 21st Corps moved at this time from Kubab to Ramleh. The positions of the divisions when the readjustment was complete were practically those shown on the map for the starting point of the operation.

The 31st and 32nd Field Ambulances rejoined their division as it came up from its position on the line of communications.

The 75th Casualty Clearing Station was opened at Junction Station on December 2, the 35th at Deir Sineid on the same day, with an advance dépôt of medical stores attached to it.

The A.D.M.S. Lines of Communication took over all responsibility for

evacuation from Junction Station southwards. The 53rd Division, still just north of Beersheba, came under the orders of 20th Corps again on December 2, but as regards supplies and evacuation of sick remained under G.H.Q. Its immobile section was still in the Turkish hospital at Beersheba. The 60th and 74th immobile sections were moved to Enab on December 3, and opened in the monastery and nunnery respectively. The 10th Division immobile sections opened at Latrun with all available tents near the junction of the roads to act as a relay post on the road from Enab to Junction Station and also from the 10th Division Field Ambulances.

The distribution of the sanitary sections was as follows:—

87th, belonging to the 74th Division at Latrun; 60th at Beersheba; 18th at Belah; 53rd on its way from Belah to Latrun.

The motor ambulances of the 10th, 60th and 74th Divisions had now been all reassembled under Corps control and placed under command of an R.A.M.C. officer detailed from the 10th Division. They were stationed at Junction Station, but six Ford ambulances were attached to each division. Sixteen additional Ford cars belonging to the Motor Ambulance Convoy were attached to the Corps from G.H.Q. on December 5.

It has been shown that the attempt to carry Jerusalem in a rush without dealing with the city itself had failed. It had been found impossible for the exhausted divisions of the 21st Corps and Desert Corps to reach the Nablus Road, North of Jerusalem, owing to the strong opposition met with at Nebi Samwil. It has also been shown how the 20th Corps was brought up to take over the right half of the line and put into position to carry out a definite operation for the capture of Jerusalem.

Jerusalem, before the War, had a population of 80,000. It consists of two parts, the old city—entirely surrounded by walls—and a modern suburb on the north-west of the walled city. The city lies just below the crest and on the eastern side of the backbone or water-parting of Palestine. It has an altitude of 2,500 feet above the Mediterranean, and nearly 4,000 feet above the Dead Sea. Jerusalem is approached by only four main roads, roughly from the four main points of the compass; the Nablus Road on the North, the Jaffa on the West, the Hebron on the South, and the Jericho on the East. There was also a metre gauge railway to it from Jaffa, constructed about thirty years earlier. This had, however, been entirely put out of action by the Turks by the destruction of several bridges and they had at the same time removed or destroyed all the rolling stock except that captured at Junction Station and referred to before. The railway approaches the city from the south-west.

The town had no regular defences before the War. During the summer of 1917 the Turks had prepared a fairly complete system of trenched defences about four thousand yards from the city on the western side and a series of trenches of a slighter nature across the Hebron Road, about six miles from the town just south of Bethlehem. Nowhere were the defences deep, and rarely consisted of more than a single line of trenches with

communication trenches leading back from them to the crest of the hill. In some parts where the ground was very hard and steep, walls took the place of trenches. The western defences were on the forward slope of the backbone ridge and extended from just west of the village of Malha northwards right across the Jaffa Road to Nebi Samwil. This is a distance of about ten thousand yards as the crow flies, but owing to the windings of the hill contour, it was much longer as regards length of front. On the east side of the town, and separated from it by the deep valley of the Kedron, is the Mount of Olives, a hill almost as high as that on the west side of Jerusalem. It looks down on the city on the one side and on the Jordan and Dead Sea, about fifteen miles away, on the other.

The approach is steep almost everywhere. The line of hills forming the entrenched position on the west is broken only at the point where the Wadi Haunina passes through. This wadi, starting some eight miles north of Jerusalem, runs close to the Nablus Road as far as Lifteh and then turning west, passes through the line of trenches about half a mile further west. The Jaffa-Jerusalem Road runs up the wadi, mounting gradually on the southern side until at Lifteh it leaves the valley and crosses over the crest into the north-west suburbs of the town.

Opposite the village of Ain Karim, two miles further south, there is a spur running out from the main position in a south-easterly direction and separated from it only by a small depression. If this spur were in the hands of an attacking force, it would give a comparatively easy approach to the main position. Very little was known definitely about the Turks available for the defence of Jerusalem. The estimate given on December 3 was that on the Hebron Road, there were between five and twelve hundred, and from the right of the 60th Division to the left of the 10th Division at Suffa, a maximum of fifteen thousand. To oppose these there were the four divisions of the 20th Corps.

The scheme for the operation was as follows :—

Nebi Samwil was to serve as a pivot. The existing line from Nebi Samwil to Suffa was to be held by one brigade of the 74th Division on the right and the three brigades of the 10th on the left. Two brigades of dismounted Australian Light Horse prolonged the left flank and connected up with the 21st Corps. The two remaining brigades of the 74th and the whole of the 60th Division were to attack the western defences of Jerusalem, from Ain Karim on the south, to Nebi Samwil on the north. Two brigades of the 53rd Division, marching up from Beersheba, by the Hebron Road, were to make a simultaneous attack from the south. The remaining brigade of the 53rd was left at Beersheba, chiefly owing to lack of transport. The dividing line between the 60th and 74th Divisions was the Jaffa-Jerusalem road as far as Lifteh and beyond that the Wadi Hannina.

The attack was to take place at dawn on December 8, and the 53rd Division was to reach Sherafat, south of Jerusalem, by the morning of that day, so as to co-operate in the attack.

The western attack was divided into four stages.

In the first stage the 60th Division was to capture the enemy works between Malha and the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, and the 74th the enemy's works between that road and Nebi Samwil, which covered the village of Beit Ikhsa. The advance of the 74th Division was to be timed by that of the 60th.

In the second stage the 60th, swinging leftwards, would advance across the plateau behind the defences to the line of the road between Jerusalem and Lifteh.

In the third stage the 60th would advance as far as the line of the track running from the Nablus road to Beit Ikhsa from the commencement of the track to where it crosses the Wadi Hannina. The 74th would at the same time advance to take possession of the spur of hill running south-east from Nebi Samwil.

In the fourth stage the 60th would advance astride of the Nablus road as far as Shafat and push forward to secure the high ground on the east of the road, including Tel el Ful, a prominent conical hill just east of the road. The rôle of the 53rd Division was to cover the right flank of the 60th Division, advancing with it as soon as touch was obtained and then moving in two parties north and south respectively of the city to take up positions on the east of the town, which would protect the 20th Corps' right flank from attack from the east.

The Corps cavalry regiment, the Westminster Dragoons, was attached to the 53rd Division, and was detailed to patrol the Jerusalem-Jericho road as soon as it was reached.

Before the attack began, owing to the absence of cross-country roads, it was exceedingly difficult to maintain communication with the 53rd Division. It had to be done largely by aeroplane.

For the first stage of the operation the 60th Division was employing two brigades, the 179th and the 180th, the 181st being in reserve. The 179th was instructed to seize the high ground to the south of Ain Karim overnight and make an attack at dawn along the ridge which, as described above, runs out as a spur from the main position. The 180th was to divide its attack between the Jaffa road and a wadi immediately to the south of Deir Yesin, which was the main gun position and lies just behind the highest point of the crest. It was strictly enjoined upon all ranks that under no circumstances was the walled city of Jerusalem to be entered or shelled.

The medical arrangements were as follows :—

The nearest casualty clearing station was at Junction Station, more than twenty-five miles from Jerusalem. Owing to transport difficulties and the state of the roads, it was impossible to get one up nearer. The Turkish railway was usable between Junction Station and Deir Sineid for evacuation, when it was not washed away. The 35th Casualty Clearing Station was at Deir Sineid, with a siding on the broad gauge railway which

had now been brought in to this point from Deir el Belah. The Jaffa-Jerusalem railway was completely out of action owing to destruction of bridges. The immobile section of the 10th Division was at Latrun, equipped with tents and prepared to take in two hundred and fifty cases. The immobile sections of the 60th and 74th Divisions were in a monastery and a disused nunnery respectively at Enab, and could house at a pinch seven or eight hundred cases. The route of evacuation from Kubeibah across the mountains to Enab was exceedingly bad and only fit for camel or hand transport.

The 53rd Immobile Section remained at Beersheba, prepared to take casualties evacuated by the 53rd Division until they were within reach of Jerusalem.

The distribution of motor ambulances was as follows :—

Six were placed at the disposal of the A.D.M.S. 10th Division for evacuation on the Beit Sira and Beit Likia routes to Latrun.

The 53rd Division had the whole of their cars and ten additional Fords from G.H.Q., and with these were responsible for evacuation of their casualties right through Hebron and Beersheba to Imara.

All the remaining motor ambulances of the Corps were parked at Enab, one quarter at the disposal of the A.D.M.S. 60th to work forward from the dressing station and the remainder under the D.D.M.S. to evacuate from Enab to Junction Station.

Routes of evacuation for the divisions was as follows :—

In the initial stages :—

60th Division to the Enab-Jerusalem road and thence to Enab.

74th Division via Biddu and Kubeibah to Enab.

10th Division—Right flank to Kubeibah and thence to Enab.

Left flank to Beit Likia or Beit Sira and thence to Latrun.

In the later stages :—

The 60th Division was to establish dressing stations in suitable buildings in the north-west suburb (European Quarter) of Jerusalem and the 60th, 74th, and 53rd Divisions were then to be evacuated through these to Enab. Sand carts were to be used on the Enab-Jerusalem and Jerusalem-Nablus roads and possibly between Kubeibah and Enab, if a new road which was being made could be got ready in time. Elsewhere camel cacolets and carriage by hand would have to be used. One hundred Egyptian Labour Corps men were distributed among the divisions to assist in the carriage of wounded by hand, with instructions that they were not to be used in the front line during action. Preparations were made on the basis of a possible three thousand casualties occurring during the operation.

The 18th Sanitary Section was held in readiness to move forward into Jerusalem as soon as possible after its capture.

During the operation I remained at Latrun while my D.A.D.M.S., Major Lelean, took up his station at Enab to superintend the evacuation from that place.

The weather on December 7 was very wet and the Enab road became almost impassable for cars.

The attack took place as arranged at dawn on the 8th, and news was received by 8.30 a.m. that the first objective had been gained with comparatively small casualties. Unfortunately the 53rd Division, owing to the bad weather, had been unable to reach the position on the Hebron Road between Sur Bahir and Sherafat from which it was to co-operate with the 60th Division in the further advance. It was therefore decided to hold up the advance until it arrived. This did not take place until late on the night of the 8th so that the resumption of the attack was fixed for the dawn of the 9th.

During the interval the Turks were busy withdrawing from the town to the north and east.

The order by the Turkish commandant to the Mayor to surrender the town was signed in the study of the residence of the English Bishop of Jerusalem at 3 p.m. on December 8, and at 9 a.m. on the 9th the Mayor came out and handed over the keys to one of the brigadiers of the 60th Division.

During the 9th the 60th and 74th Divisions pushed on according to plan and by nightfall had gained their final objectives and were holding the line just north of Shafat. It was found that the Turks had only retired a mile or two down the Jericho road so that it was impossible for the Corps cavalry to proceed far along that road.

The 53rd Division took up a position on the Mount of Olives and on the Jericho road near Bethany so as to cover Jerusalem from the east.

The medical arrangements worked according to plan: The 2/4th Field Ambulance had an advanced dressing station in a monastery at Ain Karim to which casualties were brought from the right brigade of the 60th Division. The 2/5th had one in a house at Kolonieh where the Jerusalem road crosses the Wadi Hannina. The wounded had to be brought down to the advanced dressing stations almost entirely by hand carriage. Those from the 2/4th were evacuated through the 2/5th and taken thence to Enab in sand carts.

The 221st Field Ambulance of the 74th Division also had a dressing station at Kolonieh, but practically the whole of the casualties of this division were taken to Kubeibah.

As soon as Jerusalem was occupied the 2/5th Field Ambulance took over a portion of the Jewish hospital on the Enab road near the outskirts of the new town, and soon afterwards the 2/4th and 2/6th moved into permanent buildings in the Russian enclosure which were well adapted for temporary hospitals and which had been used as such by the Turks.

The 2/4th sent on an advanced dressing station to the beginning of the Nablus road just outside Jerusalem on the north side.

The numbers of wounded in this operation were surprisingly small. The 60th had evacuated three hundred and thirty-seven and the 74th

one hundred and ninety-nine, to Junction Station by December 13. This did not include a few retained in Jerusalem as being too ill to move. The 53rd Division had practically no casualties and the 10th, which was holding the line, was not attacked and only had ten wounded during the period. The total wounded, therefore, was under six hundred. During the same period, i.e. from the 9th to 13th inclusive, eight hundred and fifty-one were evacuated sick from the Corps.

In the Turkish hospitals in Jerusalem we found about six hundred sick and wounded Turks. There was little or no infectious disease among them, but they were suffering badly from want of food and dressings. A special convoy of twenty Ford motor vans containing these necessaries was sent up immediately by G.H.Q. to relieve the situation, and the sick and wounded prisoners were evacuated as quickly as possible.

On the 10th I went up to Jerusalem to inspect the arrangements for evacuation, and along the whole route found everything working satisfactorily.

The 10th Division immobile section at Latrun was not overcrowded. Those of the 60th and 74th at Enab were practically clear, and the field ambulances of the 74th at Kubeibah were reported the same.

At Kolonieh the dressing stations of the 2/5th London and the 229th Field Ambulances were clear. The former was moving forward to Jerusalem and the latter rejoining the rest of the unit at Enab.

At Jerusalem the 2/4th and 2/6th London Field Ambulances were occupying the buildings in the Russian enclosure. Two buildings, the palace of the Archimandrite and the adjoining pilgrim hospice were being used for British patients and a third building for Turkish prisoners. The French hospital of St. Louis, under the charge of some local nursing sisters, contained a few wounded Yeomanry belonging to the Corps cavalry under their own medical officer.

Cook's hotel, just inside the city gates, which had been used by the Turks as a hospital and managed by some American Red Cross ladies, contained a few British wounded prisoners, left behind by the Turks, and 158 Turks, mostly serious cases.


Arrangements were made for the clearing of this hospital as soon as possible. Turkish wounded, if too bad to move, were transferred to the Russian building. Arrangements were also made for the 53rd Division to open a field ambulance in the small, well-appointed Rothschild Hospital. The German Deaconess Hospital, which is an exceedingly well-appointed, up-to-date hospital, was visited, but was left free for the use of the civil population under instructions from the D.M.S.

The English Hospital, which before the War was a modern, well-equipped hospital under the charge of Dr. Masterman, of the London Mission to Jews, had been dismantled by the Turks, and used as their Corps Headquarters. This was now taken over by the 60th Divisional Headquarters.

Jerusalem, owing to the need at certain times of the year for accommodating large numbers of pilgrims of all classes, contains a considerable number of hospices constructed by the charitable of all nations and sects for this purpose. These are, for the most part, large and well adapted for the temporary accommodation of casualties. They proved most useful in the ensuing weeks when continuous bad weather interfered with evacuation down the line, and enabled us to accommodate a large number of sick and wounded in comparative comfort.

This visit to Jerusalem on the day following its first occupation by Christian troops after seven hundred and eighty years was a memorable and thrilling experience.

The Jaffa road winds slowly up the hill which shuts out all view of the city until the crest is reached. Recurrent disappointment at the numerous



Sir Edmund Allenby about to enter Jerusalem.

bends only adds to the excitement of the final moment when the town bursts into view. One could not help having something of a Crusader's feelings. Of course, Jerusalem was not the ultimate goal for which we were fighting, as it had been that of the first Crusaders; but we should not have been human, I think, had we not felt that in a measure we were the successors of those old ancestors of ours who came so far and went through so much for their religion's sake. Jerusalem still stands for something to the Christian world. At the least it is the point of issue of the greatest influence the world has ever known, and to most of us infinitely more than that.

To add to one's own feelings of excitement there was the evident joy and enthusiasm betokened in the faces of the inhabitants. They thronged the streets to welcome us as deliverers from a hated rule.

Jerusalem is not a Turkish town. Two-thirds of the population are Jews, and a considerable proportion of the remainder Christians, and of the Mohammedans only a small part are Turkish sympathizers. There is a

considerable element which has German leanings, but these were doubtless in the background on that day.

There was no time on this occasion to explore the city but the little one saw whetted the appetite for more.

The state entry of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edmund Allenby, into the walled city took place next day, December 11. The entry was made on foot through the Jaffa gate. He was accompanied only by a small staff and an escort containing representatives of the troops of England, France and Italy. He proceeded to the old Turkish barracks where the proclamation was read. No triumph and no display.

Thus ended another phase of the Palestine expedition.

(To be continued.)

Current Literature.

COOK, S. S. The Incidence of Cerebrospinal Fever in the United States Navy as related to Length of Service and Season of Enlistment. *Amer. J. Hyg.* 1936, v. 23, 472-85, 2 figs.

In this very careful investigation two periods in which conditions were very different were selected for study. The first comprises the war years 1917 and 1918 when recruits were assembled hurriedly into overcrowded barracks, hastily equipped and trained, and transferred to active and strenuous duties aboard ship and elsewhere. For comparison with these years the five-year period 1926 to 1930 was chosen, during which recruiting, equipping and training proceeded in an unhurried, deliberate manner. During 1917-18 the incidence of cerebrospinal fever in the Navy was very high; from 1926 to 1930 it was above the usual average, but there was no sharp widespread epidemic as in 1917-18. In each year the highest incidence falls within the first two months of service, the maximum being more often in the second than in the first month. If the first two months of service be grouped together the attack rate diminishes regularly and rapidly with increasing length of service. It is of interest that during 1917-18, when the incidence in the Navy as a whole was at a maximum (two to three times the rate in 1926 to 1930), and when training stations were most crowded, the attack rates in recruits during their first three months of service were not higher than was usual in 1926 to 1930. The fatality rate was no greater in men recently enlisted than in those with longer service, so that the recruit's greater risk of attack is not associated apparently with greater severity of the disease.

In 1926 to 1930 attack rates per 100,000 in men of more than two months' service were 21.4 at training stations and 2.4 elsewhere. The difference cannot be attributed wholly to a less favourable environment at